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Introduction
In recent times, it has become a commonplace claim that Turkey’s Islamic identity
has started to play a more significant role in the self-identification and worldview
of many Turkish people. This phenomenon has been particularly considered as a
sign of the rise of Islamism in Turkey under Justice and Development Party (JDP)
rule since 2002.1 This new strength of Islam has alternatively been considered
as a unique product of the failure of Islamism,2 or interestingly, as a success
of Kemalism by some social scientists,3 while others have interpreted it as a
manifestation of the urgent need to reform the authoritarian Republican
ideology.4 Needless to say, Islamists, through their discursive transformation and
an ad hoc advocacy of the reforms stipulated for the European Union (EU)
accession process, have brought a brand new political understanding to Turkish
politics. The JDP’s new politics should also be regarded as the culmination of
transformations in the various Islamic sectors in Turkey, from religious orders
and communities to intellectuals.5
Scholars of Islamism mostly believe that there are two phases of Turkish
Islamism in the post-1980 period. The Islamism of the 1980s was characterized by
an authoritarian and collective search for a new Islamic identity and a quest for
an Islamic state, derived from a Jacobin understanding of state and revolution.
The Islamism of the 1990s dropped its claim for an Islamic state and revolution
and started to focus on individualist Islamic demands and experiences rather
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1 Angel Rabasa and F. Stephen Larabee, The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey, RAND Corporation,
Santa Monica, CA, 2008, p. 1. In the November 2002 elections, the JDP won 34 per cent of the votes,
enabling it to govern on its own. In the July 2007 elections, it fared even better, winning 46.6 per cent of
the vote. In the March 2009 local elections, it also gathered about 39 per cent of the vote and is still the
largest political party in Turkey.
2 Ziya Meral, ‘The AK Party, the failure of Islamism and traditional Turkish politics’, Nthposition,
8 January 2008, ,http://www.denizenscorner.com/2008/01/ak-party-failure-of-islamism-and.html. .
3 Kemal Karpat interprets the JDP’s retreat from Islamism as a revolution for both Turkey and
the Muslim world. According to Karpat, Islamic circles have accepted all the arguments that the
secularist state has defended until now, Derya Sazak’s interview with Kemal Karpat, Milliyet, 12
July 2004.
4 Nilu¨fer Go¨le, ‘Cumhuriyetc¸i I˙deoloji Kendini Yenilemeli’, Ays¸e O¨zgu¨n’s interview, Hu¨rriyet
Pazar Eki, 29 July 2007.
5 Burhanettin Duran, ‘JDP and foreign policy as an agent of transformation’, in M. H. Yavuz (ed.),
The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the Ak Parti, The University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City,
UT, 2006, p. 281.
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than collective Islamist demands.6 This change was politically reflected by an
internal critique over the experiences of the Welfare Party (WP) in the 1990s.
The WP’s politicization of religion is seen as one of the reasons for the eradication
of Islam’s social, cultural and economic influence in Turkey. Later in 2001, the
establishment of the JDP and its departure from the rigid ideological framework
of the National Outlook (Milli Go¨ru¨s¸) parties came about as a natural extension of
this critique.
The paper at hand attempts to argue that since 2002, a third phase of Islamism
has been taking place in Turkey. Islamists have been experiencing power,
enrichment, upward class mobilization and they have pursued successful careers
during the JDP governments. Opportunity spaces within the public sphere have
opened up for Islamists so that they have now reached the higher echelons of
bureaucracy and become owners of large companies and media groups. They are
much more power and wealth oriented than ever before. Accordingly, when
faced with the secularizing aspects of being powerful and rich, many Islamists
have experienced the loss of a certain spiritual identity in this period. Islamist
discourses often claim to offer a meaning to the lives of ‘ordinary’ Turkish people,
by filling the ethical and ideological void generated by the radical secularist
reforms of Kemalism. But today they seem to be challenged by an ethical void
emanating from the effects of capitalist consumerism on the daily lives of Turkish
people, including Islamists.
It is my contention in this paper that much as Islamists have been integrated
into the political processes by electoral mechanisms since 1970, Kemalist
securitization7 and control over religion in the name of secularism is a significant
reason for the impoverishment of the Islamist discourses. Securitization
also conceals aspects of that impoverishment that stem from a position of
power and consumerism within Islamism itself. The literature on the Islamic
transformation in Turkey fails to recognize the impoverishing aspects of
the secularist constraints placed upon an Islamist agenda while addressing
economic and political opportunity structures given by international conjuncture
and Kemalism (global economic interdependence, electoral politics and the
EU process). In a deeper sense, Kemalism not only determines and transforms
Islamist discourses in Turkey but also impoverishes them.
Towards this end, this paper has sought to address the specificities of Turkish
Islamism from a historical perspective. It also focuses on the nature of the
relationship between Kemalism and Islamism in Turkey and tries to show how
Kemalist securitization has impoverished the content of Islamist discourses by
making illegal any autonomous existence for religious groups and by making the
popular Islamic identity insecure. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates that
mainstream Turkish Islamism has benefited much from the opportunities created
by the processes of globalization and integration with the EU in the last decade.
6 Kenan C¸ayır discovers self-reflexive and confessional aspects of Islamism in the 1990s by
pointing out the transition from collectivism to individualism in the Islamist movement through an
analysis of Islamic novels, Islamic Literature in Contemporary Turkey: From Epic to Novel, Palgrave
Macmillan, New York, 2007.
7 Securitization is a development that moves a particular issue beyond the established rules of the
game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Barry Buzan, Ole
Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1998,
p. 23.
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Islamists have changed their views on democracy and focused on tolerance,
pluralism, and the participatory aspects of democracy and civil society.
The Islamic middle classes and a rising new bourgeoisie are influential actors
in this transformation. Moreover, it examines the parameters of the JDP’s victory
over the last decade and its implications for Turkish Islamism. It unearths a
somewhat unnoticed impact of the JDP rule: the impoverishment of Islamist
discourses.
Turkish Islamism from a historical perspective
Islamist movements have been transforming their discourses and programmes in
many parts of the Muslim world since the late 1990s. This newly emerging form
of Islamism embraces a political discourse that prioritizes curtailing the role of
the state. In this form, it is argued that constitutional limits to government or
legal recourse prevent the state from intruding too far into social and private
lives, and this is a well-established tradition in Muslim societies. This tradition is
reinterpreted to accommodate universal values such as democracy, human rights
and civil society. In this vein, it is suggested that the domain of the state in its
reach into society should be restricted as much as possible so as to maximize
social and individual choices and differences. The state should not endorse any
single comprehensive doctrine. This form of Islamism also emphasizes the
dialogue and interaction between Islam and the West. In a sense, Islamism has
passed into ‘a post-Islamist stage in which Islamism is losing its political and
revolutionary fervour’ but is continuously infiltrating the social and cultural
practices of daily life.8
An analysis of Turkish Islamism is needed to incorporate studies on
non-Western or multiple modernity approaches.9 The contemporary rise of
Islamism should not be seen as an anti-global, anti-Western defence of
threatened Islamic traditional societies, but rather as a ‘part of multiple
modernization processes in different world regions, multiple constellations of
nation-state formation and democratization as well as religious change and
secularization in different civilizations in the present global era’.10 With
the urgent need for a response to the challenge of the West and the rejection
of a Eurocentric definition of modernity, Islamists strive for the revitalization
of Islamic civilization. The notion of Islamic civilization has constituted a
useful framework for coping with the challenge of Western modernity and
for the construction of a new (Islamic) modernity in order to meet the needs
of a truly Islamic life in the contemporary age. Since late Ottoman times,
the underlying theme inherent in Turkish Islamism has always been the
8 Nilu¨fer Go¨le, ‘Snapshots of Islamic modernities’, Daedalus, 129(1), Winter 2000, p. 94.
9 The concept of multiple modernity, as developed particularly by Shmuel Eisenstadt’s
comparative approach to civilizations, presupposes that Western modernity is only one among other
types of modernity evolving in the various civilizations of the world. It draws attention to the fact that
religious and imperial traditions remain constitutive dimensions of modern societies despite various
forms of secularization. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, ‘Multiple modernities’, Daedalus, 129(1), Winter 2000,
pp. 1–29.
10 Willfried Spohn, ‘Multiple modernity, nationalism and religion: a global perspective’, Current
Sociology, 51(3/4), May/July 2003, p. 282.
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concept of an Islamic civilization which regards Turkey as the centre of the
Muslim world.11
Islamism in Turkey, compared to its counterparts in the wider world of Islam
has its particularities based on its specific evolution. Islamism cannot be simply
confined to a movement which has a political ideology for capturing power.
Any conscious epistemological and ontological reference to Islam for shaping or
directing a state, a society and an individual, directly or indirectly should be
regarded as Islamist.12 One reason for this broad conceptualization of Islamism is
the recognition that Islamism in the Ottoman–Turkish context has been different
from the Islamism that has gained so much currency in the literature by reference
to the forms of Islam found in Iran, Egypt and Pakistan. Islamists generally
embrace the unity of religion and state, an idea that challenges the validity of the
secular democratic nation-state in the Muslim world, and in its place offer the
alternative of Sharia law. In the Turkish case, there has been no political party
openly calling for Sharia law largely due to constitutional constraints. Even
though the restoration of the Caliphate represents a general demand of most
Islamists,13 there has never been any Islamist party which calls for the restoration
of the Caliphate in Turkey.
The aforementioned particularities of Turkish Islamism or ‘Turkish exception-
alism’ do not hint that Turkish Islamism is superior to other Islamist experiences
in its adherence to liberal values and practices. It would be essentialist and
ethnocentric to attribute pluralism, tolerance and openness merely to Turkish
Islam, while regarding radicalism, violence and an inclination towards
authoritarianism as belonging to other forms of Islam.14
The primary characteristic of Turkish Islamism derives from the fact that it is
deep-rooted in Sufism. The Naks¸ibendi order has a unique position in relation to
the evolution of Turkish Islamism to the extent that all of the significant groups
engaged with the contemporary Islamist movement, ranging from politicians to
intellectuals and businessmen, have been influenced by its teachings.15 However,
it is not the Sufi tradition itself, but the specific interaction between Sufism
and the strong state tradition16 of Turkey that has a significant impact on the
11 The JDP also uses the idea of a common, universal civilization to which Islam has contributed in
order to justify Turkey’s integration with the EU, see Daniella Kuzmanovic, ‘Civilization and
EU–Turkey relations’, in Dietrich Jung and Catharina Raudvere (eds), Religion, Politics, and Turkey’s
EU Accession, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, p. 53.
12 Menderes C¸ınar and Burhanettin Duran, ‘The specific evolution of contemporary political Islam
in Turkey and its “difference”’, in U¨mit Cizre (ed.), Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of
the Justice and Development Party, Routledge, Abingdon, 2008, p. 18.
13 Mozaffari, op. cit., p. 23. Turkey is a significant country not only because it is the only Muslim
country where secularism is established as a constitutional principle and where a secular culture has
taken root, but also because it is a country that has a legacy of the Caliphate, the centre of the spiritual
leadership in Islam, though it was abolished in 1924 in Turkey. This legacy, in the eyes of Turkish
Islamists, gives Turkey an implicit right to claim a leadership of the Islamic world without mentioning
the Caliphate.
14 Elisabeth O¨zdalga, ‘The hidden Arab: a critical reading of the notion of “Turkish Islam”’, Middle
Eastern Studies, 42(4), July 2006, pp. 565–566.
15 S¸erif Mardin, ‘Turkish Islamic exceptionalism yesterday and today: continuity, rupture and
reconstruction in operational codes’, Turkish Studies, 6(2), 2005, p. 152.
16 See Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, Eothen Press, Walkington, 1985.
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moderation of Turkish Islamism.17 Largely shaped by the Sunni interpretation of
Islam, which prioritizes the necessity of political authority and for the state for
the preservation and maintenance of religion, Turkish Islamists do not resort to
violence even if they face repression from the secular regime. The Turkish
Hizbullah and a Turkish al-Qaeda cell are exceptions to this observation.18
Another characteristic of Turkish Islamism is the fragmentation of the Islamic
religious authority in Turkey. It is much more difficult in Turkey, as compared to
other Muslim societies, to answer the question, who speaks for Islam? It would
not be wrong to say that since the end of the 19th century there has been a
profound transformation in the nature and structure of religious authority in the
Muslim world.19 But in the Turkish case, this is more obvious due to the radical
secularizing reforms of the Kemalist regime. The ulema did not have a monopoly
over Islamic discourses in the late Ottoman times and they have even less
authority in the Republican era. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet I˙s¸leri
Bas¸kanlıg˘ı) as a rather non-influential remnant of the ulema, has a minor role in the
production of Islamist discourses. No other Muslim country has disempowered
the ulema and disassociated its regime from Islam in the same way that Turkey
has under Kemalism. On the one hand, stemming from this disempowerment,
though they are legally forbidden, religious communities and orders such as the
Gu¨len Movement and the Naks¸ibendi Order are very influential in the religious
life of Turkish society. But on the other hand, intellectuals, writers or just ordinary
Muslims, many of them educated in secular Kemalist institutions, have
developed their own interpretations of Islam, indirectly challenging the ulema’s
or the sheikhs’ claim to speak for Islam. This is much related to the observation
that Islamic responses and oppositions to the Kemalist regime do not constitute a
monolithic whole. It is true to say that the ulema, the sheikhs, Islamist intellectuals
and politicians have different attitudes towards the Kemalist reforms.
It should also be noted that Turkey has never been colonized, though it fought
a war of independence. Turkish Islamism has been imbued with some level of
anti-Western feelings due to the memories of the 19th-century Ottoman political
experience, the First World War and the War of Independence. Nevertheless, the
West has not constituted, not least in part due to the Westernist reforms of the
Kemalist modernization, the ‘other’ in the making of a Turkish identity. Leading
elements of Turkish Islamism abandoned their anti-European discourses in the
late 1990s and have supported Turkey’s integration into Europe.20
17 Naks¸ibendism is an international Sufi order that takes different political forms in various
Islamic countries. It may take the form of a jihadist movement when faced with a colonial power. For
the various manifestations of Sufism, depending on the local context of Islamic countries, see Martin
van Bruinessen and Julia Day Howell (eds), Sufism and the Modern in Islam, I. B. Tauris, London, 2007.
18 Radical Islamist groups are very marginal and are not connected to any significant sector of
Turkish society: Islamic Great Eastern Raiders-Front (IBDA-C), Turkish Hizbullah and the Union of
Islamic Communities and Societies (UICS). Among these groups, Hizbullah is an important Kurdish
Sunni organization which carried out hundreds of kidnappings and murders, and gained its identity
during its fight with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), Bu¨lent Aras and S¸ule Toktas¸, ‘Al-Qaida,
“War on Terror” and Turkey’, Third World Quarterly, 28(5), 2007, pp. 1045–1046. For the radicalization
process of Hizbullah, see Emrullah Uslu, ‘From local Hizbollah to global terror: militant Islam in
Turkey’, Middle East Policy, 14(1), Spring 2007.
19 See Dale F. Eickelman and James P. Piscatori, Muslim Politics, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ, 1996.
20 C¸ınar and Duran, op. cit., p. 24.
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Furthermore, Turkish Islamism is basically an urban movement empowered
by a strong middle class with its own identity politics.21 Islamists try to recreate
modern codes of urbanity, civility and universalism, blending them with their
own religious features. There is an emergence of a new Islamic bourgeoisie.
The market not only secularizes Islamists, but also contributes to democratic
stability and human rights in Turkey.22 The class bases of Islamism in Turkey
have been enlarged in the post-1980 period by liberal economic policies,
which introduced market mechanisms, new communications technologies, the
privatization process and private organs of the media. In the 1990s, Islamist
individuals and bodies developed new public faces and created their
alternative public spheres which ranged from radio stations and TV channels
to hotels.
Altogether, as suggested earlier, one of the most striking characteristics of
Turkish Islamism has been related to the nature of the relationship between
Kemalism and Islam since the foundation of the Republic. Regardless of the fact
that Islamists have been integrated into the political processes by electoral
mechanisms since 1970, the securitizing and controlling nature of the Kemalist
approach towards Islam has had an impoverishing effect on the content
of Turkish Islamist discourses. The transformation and impoverishment of
Islamism in Republican Turkey cannot be fully comprehended without an
exclusive emphasis on the Kemalist securitization of Islam through secularism.
Kemalism and Islamism: control, securitization and the 28 February Process
Kemalism continuously instrumentalizes Islam by employing a two-sided
approach. On the one hand, when it needed to cement its position and act as a
mechanism of control for the unity and mobilization of Turkish society, it
supported its usage in the public sphere in order to legitimize its own aims. On the
other hand, it has continued to maintain that Islam is responsible for Turkey’s
backwardness and that it is an obstacle to reaching the level of modern
civilization.23 Stemming from this dual intertwined pattern, the principle
of secularism has served both as a mechanism of state control over the religious
sphere and as a discourse of securitization in Turkey. Contrary to the conventional
separation of religious and political institutions, secularism is seen as the
regulation and disciplining of religious life and institutions by the state through
the Directorate of Religious Affairs. At the same time, it was also developed into
an ideological core element of Kemalism to the extent that its preservation became
identified with the defence of the Republican state and reforms.24 This dimension
is related to the politicization and securitization of Islam.
Paradoxically, secularism has not been regarded as a process to depoliticize
Islam; rather it had removed Islam from its political role in the Ottoman system
21 C¸ınar and Duran, op. cit., p. 25.
22 Demet Yalcin Mousseau, ‘Democracy, human rights and market development in Turkey: are
they related?’, Government and Opposition, 41(2), 2006, pp. 325–326.
23 Sencer Ayata, ‘Patronage, party and the state: the politicization of Islam in Turkey’, Middle East
Journal, 50(1), Winter 1996, p. 41.
24 Dietrich Jung, ‘“Secularism”: a key to Turkish politics’, Intellectual Discourse, 14(2), 2006, pp. 131,
133; Christopher Houston, ‘Civilizing Islam, Islamist civilizing? Turkey’s Islamist movement and the
problem of ethnic difference’, Thesis Eleven, No. 58, August 1999, p. 87.
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while politicizing and enlivening it in new ways to support the Kemalist regime.
Thus, there has never been a time in the republican history in which Islam
was not politicized by the state though there are some differences in state
policies between the single-party period (1923–50), the rule of the rightist
parties and the period after the 1980 military coup.25 The politicization of Islam
(producing an acceptable interpretation of Islam)26 in the hands of the state
has been accompanied by a securitization of Islamic demands. The Turkish
modernizing elites have often securitized any religious or ethnic claims of
identity, including the Islamic one. The state is not only controlling every
religious activity, ranging from its organization to its place in education but also
presenting an acceptable concept of Islam as opposed to its reactionary and
dangerous interpretations. Through this mechanism of control and the discourse
of securitization, the state determines and shapes religious discourses in all
public contexts in order to accommodate them to the ‘official’ interpretation of
Islam. It places some limitations on autonomous religious practice as a matter of
national security.27
Hence, securitization is a key to comprehending the true nature of the
relationship between Kemalism and Islamism. The Kemalist regime defines any
challenge to its ideological hegemony as a security threat, thus justifying its
exclusionary policies regarding identity issues. In the politics of securitization, a
discourse of an unending state of emergency is used to rationalize and justify
extensions to an unaccountable state power. It is basically a process of state-led
securitization and the object of security is the secularity and integrity of the
Republican state.28 International events are also translated into domestic politics
in order to justify the policies of Kemalist securitization. For instance, for most
hard-line Kemalists, Iran, Saudi Arabia and an Afghanistan under the Taliban,
serve as alarmist and frightening exemplar figures that justify their secularist
policy of limiting autonomous Islamic practices.29 While establishing an official
and acceptable form of Islam by controlling the religious sphere, Kemalism
actually made any autonomous existence illegal for religious groups and thus
made the popular Islamic identity insecure in Turkey. Along with the transition
25 Ibid., pp. 86–87; Andrew Davison, ‘Turkey, a “secular” state?: the challenge of description’, The
South Atlantic Quarterly, 102(2/3), Spring/Summer 2003, pp. 333–350.
26 Bobby S. Sayyid draws attention to the policy of trying to use Islam as the antagonistic ‘other’ of
Kemalism, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism, Zed Books, London, 1997.
Since Islam was continually being described as the constitutive ‘outside’ of Kemalism, at the same
time it has been an issue of securitization as well. In fact, securitization is simply a stronger instance of
the phenomenon of politicization, Michael Sheehan, International Security, Lynne Rienner, Boulder,
CO, 2005, p. 53.
27 Secularism is not the only issue of securitization in Turkey. There are other identity issues that
have been expressed in security language such as the Alevi and Kurdish questions. These issues
warrant further study. For more on Turkish national security, see U¨mit Cizre, ‘Demythologyzing the
national security concept: the case of Turkey’, Middle East Journal, 57(2), Spring 2003, pp. 213–229.
28 See Tuncay Kardas, ‘Turkey: Islam, secularism and the EU’, in Stig Hansen, Atle Mesoy and
Tuncay Kardas (eds), The Borders of Islam, Columbia University Press, New York, 2009. Pınar Bilgin
finds an intimate relationship between secularism and security and argues that the securityness of
secularism in Turkey should be located both in its national and international arena since the
foundation of the Republic, ‘The securityness of secularism? The case of Turkey’, Security Dialogue,
39(6), December 2008, pp. 593–614.
29 Kim Shively, ‘Taming Islam: studying religion in secular Turkey’, Anthropological Quarterly,
81(3), Summer 2008, pp. 707, 687–688.
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to multi-party politics, the insecurity of religious orders and communities was
translated into a struggle for power to assure a secure place in society.30
The clientelist nature of the relationship between the right-wing political parties
and religious groups in the 1950s and 1960s could not change the securitizing
aspects of Kemalism towards Islamic demands. The emergence of the National
Outlook Movement parties in Turkish politics further aggravated this politics of
securitization. The last two decades have witnessed a series of events along these
lines, notably the 28 February Process (a postmodern coup in 1997), the closure
of the Islamist parties (the Welfare Party and the Virtue Party) and the ban
on the headscarf in universities. As a reaction to the rise of Islamism in the 1990s,
the Kemalist establishment triggered a process of re-securitization, called the
28 February Process31 in order to demolish public visibility of Islam. This process
made it clear that the Kemalist establishment could not allow Islamist attempts to
introduce Islamic symbols and idioms to political rhetorics, which would modify
the standards of legitimization for politics in Turkey. In spite of a set of radical
reforms carried out in the last decade, passed to meet EU membership terms,
any expression of Islamic discourse in the public realm is still an issue of
securitization. In this sense, Kemalism effectively determines the contours of the
Islamic political discourses in the country. It can be argued that this controlling
and securitizing nature of Kemalist secularism has been influential in the
making of a power-oriented Islamic movement, which shows a secondary
concern for creating a new political language of Islam. This is strongly related to
the continuing weakness in the intellectual roots of Islamism (in contrast to its
socio-political strength) in Turkey.32
A typical example of Kemalist securitization in relation to Islam is the issue of
the headscarf which has become one of the nodal points in Turkish politics. It is a
master signifier that organizes all competitive symbols around the struggle of
power and lifestyles between Kemalists and Islamists.33 The headscarf acquires
an aspect of religious freedom when articulated with Islamist demands and a
quest for an Islamic political system when articulated with Kemalist fears.
The Constitutional Court, in its decision on the closure of the Welfare Party,
presented the following arguments against the headscarf: firstly, it restricts
women’s liberties; secondly, it is a symbol of opposition to the Republic; thirdly, it
would lead to unequal treatment; and lastly, it implies the threat of the
organizing of the state according to the dictates of Islam.34
30 C¸ınar and Duran, op. cit., p. 28.
31 Starting at the end of 1996, a series of events during the Welfare-Party-led coalition government
culminated in a crisis for the Turkish political regime. On 28 February 1997, the National Security
Council (Milli Gu¨venlik Kurulu) made recommendations to the government about measures to be
taken against the increasing anti-secular activities. This military intervention brought down the
Welfare-led coalition government and later the Welfare Party was closed down by the Turkish
Constitutional Court for its anti-secular activities.
32 See Ahmet C¸ig˘dem, Tas¸ra Epig˘i: Tu¨rk I˙deolojileri ve I˙slamcılık, Birikim, I˙stanbul, 2001.
33 See Tuncay Kardas, ‘Security governmentality in Turkey’, unpublished PhD Thesis, University
of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2006.
34 Yes¸im Arat, ‘Group-differentiated rights and the liberal democratic state: rethinking the
headscarf controversy in Turkey’, New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 25, Fall 2001, pp. 38–40. The issue of
the headscarf as a subject of securitization also resurfaced when the JDP cooperated with the
Nationalist Action Party to pass two amendments to the Constitution that would allow the wearing of
headscarves in universities on 9 February 2008. The Republican People’s Party (RPP), the main
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Nevertheless, the Kemalist experience of secularism and the particularities of
Turkish Islam, interacting with each other, have produced a more moderate
course of Islamism and have prevented any radicalization of the Islamist
movement even in times of repression. Above all, Kemalist securitization is a
dynamic and complex process which has two different and interrelated aspects:
the inclusion of Islamist actors for power-sharing and the exclusion of Islamist
discourses. On the one hand, it integrates Islamist actors into Turkish party
politics by allowing their competition for power and the expression of some
modest Islamist discourses while in opposition. On the other hand, once they
are in power, these Islamist actors are expected to drop their Islamist demands
and discourses. Islamist figures can even lead the country whether as president
or as prime minister, if they disown the Islamist discourse. Otherwise, the
several disciplining and silencing mechanisms of Kemalism, including the
Turkish Constitutional Court, securitize any Islamist claims for change in the
secularist nature of the Republic and exclude Islamist discourses from the public
arena. This dual nature of Kemalist securitization has generated rather
interesting implications for Turkish Islamism. Admitting that Kemalism
provides various structures of opportunities for the increasing significance
and influence of Islamist political and social actors, it still insists in illegalizing
any autonomous religious organization and any expression of Islamist
discourses by these actors in the political arena. An important consequence
of this securitization is a loss of a public negotiation between secular and
Islamic discourses which might bring about a deeper exploration of the
relationship between Islam and democracy.
In sum, to reduce the reason for the transformation of Turkish Islamism to the
lessons learnt from the 28 February Process is to misread the dynamics and trends
of Islamism in Turkey. It ignores the profound transformation of Islamist ideas
about secularism, democracy and the EU through interaction with Western and
Turkish secularist circles. A multi-dimensional approach should be employed to
account for the political changes in Turkish Islamism, to go beyond the lessons
learnt from the 28 February Process. Along these lines of analyses, both sides of
the so-called change should be noted: respectively, a transformation led by
the rise of the new Islamic bourgeoisie given appropriate opportunities over the
last two decades and an impoverishment represented by the loss of an Islamic
vocabulary and ethos amongst the Islamist circles.
Aspects of transformation in Turkish Islamism: the new Islamic middle classes
and opportunities
Although the transformation of Islamists gained momentum with the recognition
that there is no way out of the Kemalist impasse without further democratization
Footnote 34 continued
opposition party, took the issue to the Constitutional Court, which annulled the amendments on 5 June
2008. This securitizing atmosphere was intensified when the Chief Prosecutor of the Court of Appeals
filed a case in the Constitutional Court for the closure of the JDP and a five-year political ban for 71
members of this party (including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an and President Abdullah Gu¨l).
On 30 July 2009, the Court ruled that the JDP should not be closed down, but declared that it was a
focal point of anti-secular activities and it imposed fines on the party.
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and Europeanization, it would be a mistake to disregard the influence of the
growing demands of the Islamic middle classes (small and medium-sized
enterprise holders), the moderate positions of religious groups (e.g. the Gu¨len
Movement) and other factors such as the transformation of other societal
groups including labour unions (Hak-I˙s¸, the Confederation of Righteous Trade
Unions) and business associations (MU¨SI˙AD, the Independent Industrialists’
and Businessmen’s Association), all of which have had a cumulative effect.
The learning process for Islamist circles is perhaps best accomplished by the
aggregation and articulation of interests among the labour and business sectors
of Turkish civil society.
In the pre-1980 period, Hak-I˙s¸ reflected the discourse of the National Outlook
to create Islamist policies on labour issues. From the mid-1980s onwards, Hak-I˙s¸
managed to establish itself as a national force whose significance could not
be limited to Islamist demands. Hak-I˙s¸ was the first Islamist organization to
successfully use the discourse of civil society and democracy not only to further
the interests of the workers, but also to identify the problems regarding the
consolidation of democracy in Turkey.35 MUSI˙AD, as a powerful representative
of the Islamic bourgeoisie, combines Islamic identity with a free market ideology
and supports the exposure of the Turkish economy and society to the world.
Like other sectors of the Islamist movement, it calls for the restructuring of state–
society relations in Turkey on the basis of the principles of democracy, pluralism
and freedom. It also constitutes an Islamic model of modernity which presents a
new synthesis of the economically rational and the morally communitarian
modern self.36 The Gu¨len Movement, as the leading Islamic community in
Turkey, has a very special place in the transformation of Turkish Islamism.
This movement draws attention to the links between Islam and modernity,
and rejects the idea of an inherent clash between East and West. Although this
movement suffers from residual nationalism and statism, it has opposed
anti-Western feelings within Islamism by declaring that Turkey’s integration into
the EU would not result in a cultural assimilation for Turkish society.37
A further observation in relation to the transformation of Islamism in Turkey
is that in the post-1980 period, and especially in the 2000s, postmodernism and
liberalism had a significant impact on Islamist circles. This is a new period of
transformation for Turkish Islamism. One basic result of this transformation is
the reaching for a post-Islamist stage where the idea of an Islamic state is left
behind and the will to see Turkey as a member of the EU is welcomed by the
Islamists. In fact, Europeanization has been a significant source of transformation
in Turkey since the times of the Tanzimat.38 As with the proclamation of
35 Burhanettin Duran and Engin Yıldırım, ‘Islamism, trade unionism and civil society: the case of
Hak-I˙s¸ labour confederation in Turkey’, Middle Eastern Studies, 41(2), March 2005, pp. 227–248.
36 E. Fuat Keyman and Berrin Koyuncu, ‘Globalization, alternative modernities and the political
economy of Turkey’, Review of International Political Economy, 12(1), February 2005, p. 120.
37 Ihsan Yilmaz, ‘State, law, civil society and Islam in contemporary Turkey’, The Muslim World,
95(3), July 2005, p. 400; Mucahit Bilici, ‘The Fethullah Gu¨len Movement and its politics of
representation in Turkey’, The Muslim World, 96(1), January 2006, pp. 17–18; Ahmet Kuru,
‘Globalization and diversification of Islamic movements: three Turkish cases’, Political Science
Quarterly, 120(2), 2005, p. 265.
38 With the proclamation of the Tanzimat in 1839, known as Gu¨lhane Hatt-ı S¸erif-i (the Noble Edict
of the Rose Garden), the Ottoman statesmen aimed to restructure the Ottoman administration and to
establish the rule of law.
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constitutional rule in 1876, the extensive rights and liberties of the EU process
have contributed to the transformation of Islamism. This time though, the
transformational effects of Europe should be seen not just in the reforms of the
Westernist elite but also in the changing attitudes of Islamists towards the West
and themselves. Islamists have lessened their fears of being assimilated into a
European secular culture in the case of integration with the EU. They have
started to voice the idea that the Islamic identity is so strong that Europe could
not assimilate it, even if it so aimed. Therefore, the EU accession process is de-
securitized by the Islamists on the identity issues. Ex-Islamists, notably the JDP
leadership, have shown great determination in accelerating the pace of reforms
which have brought far-reaching changes to the Turkish political and legal
system.
Parallel to the change in the discourses of Islamist intellectuals, a process
of political division started within the National Outlook Movement, situated
somewhere between the reformists (yenilikc¸iler) and traditionalists (gelenekc¸iler).
The first group had dropped their Islamist claims and advanced a new politics,
namely, a conservative democracy under Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an’s leadership (the
JDP), while the latter preferred to keep a low profile stance until the secularist
campaign came to an end and they maintained their Islamist ideas (the Felicity
Party, Saadet Partisi).
While transplanting themselves to the root of Turkish centre right politics and
by referring to the legacies of Adnan Menderes and Turgut O¨zal, ex-Islamists of
the JDP (Erdog˘an, Gu¨l and Bu¨lent Arınc¸) having their roots in the National
Outlook Movement, have themselves undergone a transformation, thus making
feasible an Islamic-oriented party focused on the will for integration with the
EU, cooperation with the IMF, secularism and democratization. One of the
trademarks of the JDP is its criticism of Islamism, and most importantly, Islam as
a political ideology. It embraces pluralism, democracy, civil society, human rights
and secularism. Its conception of secularism rejects the French model of an
exaggerated laicism, but rather upholds the models of Anglo-Saxon countries.
Essentialist and dogmatic aspects of Turkish Islamism have been erased and
its pragmatic aspect has been strengthened by the JDP’s new discourse on
conservative democracy which attempts to achieve a compromise between Islam
and democracy.39
A major contribution that the Turkish Islamist movement seems to have
gained from the JDP’s experience in power is the development of a new
discourse on and practice of Turkish foreign policy, which combines nationalist
interests and Islamic sensitivities. The new foreign policy is largely based on a
novel geographic imagination which puts an end to the alienation of Turkey’s
neighbours and Middle Eastern countries. It also redefines Turkey as a central
country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified
character.40 It is clear that this new geographic imagination, formulated by
the Turkish foreign minister, Ahmet Davutog˘lu, underlines the necessity of
39 For conservative democracy, see Yalc¸ın Akdog˘an, ‘The meaning of conservative democratic
identity’, in M. H. Yavuz (ed.), The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti,
The University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 2006, pp. 49–65.
40 Ahmet Davutog˘lu, ‘Turkey’s foreign policy vision: an assessment of 2007’, Insight Turkey, 10(1),
2008, p. 78; Bu¨lent Aras, ‘Davutog˘lu era in Turkish foreign policy’, SETA Policy Brief, No. 32, May 2009,
p. 4.
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developing cooperative and close relations with Islamic countries by recognizing
Turkey’s ties of civilization with its neighbouring regions, including the Middle
East.41 Although this imagination is beyond neo-Ottomanism and represents a
continuity with Turkey’s activist foreign policy in the post-cold war era, it still
serves the Islamic ideals of having better relations with Muslim and Middle
Eastern countries.
First and foremost, Turkish Islamists have always criticized the Western-
oriented foreign policy of the Kemalist Republic, particularly in reference to its
estrangement from the Middle East. The JDP’s multi-dimensional foreign policy
approach not only integrates Turkey into the region, but also empowers it as
the prominent actor in a geography mostly populated by Muslim peoples.
In addition, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdog˘an’s leadership and his effective
diplomatic style, as exemplified in the Gaza crisis in 2008 and in Davos in 2009,
addresses Islamist aspirations and expectations to the extent that he emerges
as the most influential leader in the eyes of the ordinary people in the
Muslim world.
Thus, the JDP experience has transformed the parameters of both Turkish
politics and Islamist politics through Europeanization and the internationaliza-
tion of internal issues. The JDP administration, with its religious cadres and
policies, has even produced a sense of siege and insecurity amongst Kemalists.
However, the trends of transformation for Islamism in Turkey are open-ended
and incomplete. The success of this experience conceals the impoverishing
aspects of the secularist constraints placed upon an Islamist agenda.
Aspects of impoverishment and the post-Islamist triumph in the 2000s
What is the meaning of the apparent post-Islamist triumph in the Turkey of the
2000s? It is easy to find curious examples of deep scepticism towards the JDP and
its transformation in the literature. For instance, in contrast to those who view
Islamism as a search for recognition of an identity, I˙brahim Kaya insists that as a
consequence of the Islamization programme of the military in the post-1980
period, the Turkish political system has been colonized by Islamist groups. With
the JDP government, he argues that Islamists have reached a stage where they
have been developing an alternative intellectual model in order to establish their
hegemony in a Gramscian sense. The rise of the JDP and Gu¨len Movement is
described as an attempt to overcome a democratic republic with the aim of
establishing an Islamic totalitarian regime.42
Indeed, many secularists feared that the JDP would seek to undermine the
foundations of Turkey’s secular order if it succeeded in electing Foreign Minister
Abdullah Gu¨l as the eleventh president of the country in 2007. These fears led to
large-scale popular demonstrations, called Republic Meetings (Cumhuriyet
Mitingleri) by supporters of secularism in several major Turkish cities and this
environment prompted the Turkish Armed Forces to issue an e-memorandum
(e-muhtıra, a veiled threat of a military coup) on 27 April 2007. The protestors at
41 Ahmet Davutog˘lu, Stratejik Derinlik: Tu¨rkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu, Ku¨re, I˙stanbul, 2001.
42 I˙brahim Kaya, ‘Identity politics: the struggle for recognition or hegemony?’, East European
Politics and Societies, 21(4), 2007, pp. 711–712, 714–715.
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these meetings called the JDP government an existential threat to the secular and
nationalist nature of the Turkish state. Similarly, by drawing attention to the
increasing anti-secular religious activities, the generals restated, against this
challenge, their determination to protect the secular nature of the Republic.
In my own account of the above analyses, the same developments can be
interpreted in a different way. Turkish politics have presented an appearance
of stability since 2002.43 It could be stated that in spite of some evidence of
instability, such as the 27 April e-memorandum (e-muhtıra) and the crisis over the
election of a new Turkish president in the spring of 2007, the JDP’s seizure of
46 per cent of votes in the 2007 national elections and its success in electing
Abdullah Gu¨l as the new president of the Republic enabled Turkish democracy to
achieve a higher level of consolidation. Besides, the transformation of Turkish
Islamism might bring reconciliation between democratically minded secularists
and the religious circles. If this happens, then the securitizing structures of
Kemalism will eventually lose their power and a contemporary European form
of secularism will prevail in Turkey. From this perspective, the re-Islamization of
Turkish politics and society would be a continuation of Turkey’s integration
with Europe.44 Under the JDP administration, Turkey is not only rethinking its
understanding of secularism but also reshaping its Islamic identity. This
emerging synthesis is regarded as a liberal Islam in which a Turkish Islamic
sensibility coexists with a tolerant, Western-friendly pluralism.45
Apart from the discussions on the coming of an Islamist hegemony or liberal
Islam, it is better to concentrate on the different dimensions of the post-Islamist
triumph under JDP administration. Derived from the idea of an interaction
between Kemalism and Islamism, it is possible to discover the dynamics of the
shifting relationship between the Turkish Islamic actors and the secular state,
from confrontation to cooperation, and how Islamic actors and the Kemalist state
have transformed each other in the last two decades.46 However, this is not the
whole picture. The literature of transformation overemphasizes the transforma-
tive aspects of the political change that Islamists have experienced since the
28 February Process by focusing both on the significance of the learning process
and on the structures for opportunity. This literature fails to recognize the
impoverishing aspects of the secularist constraints placed upon an Islamist
agenda.
My aim in this paper is to clarify that Turkish Islamism has been made
defective by the loss of an Islamic political vocabulary and the Islamic way of life
has been impoverished due to the perverse securitization of Islam by Kemalism
at various times.47 Unlike the Young Ottomans or Islamists in different parts of
43 Ilter Turan, ‘Unstable stability: Turkish politics at the crossroads?’, International Affairs, 83(2),
2007, p. 326.
44 Perry Anderson, ‘After Kemal’, London Review of Books, 25 September 2008, pp. 148–149.
45 Thomas W. Smith, ‘Between Allah and Atatu¨rk: liberal Islam in Turkey’, The International Journal
of Human Rights, 9(3), September 2005, p. 308.
46 Berna Turam, Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement, Stanford University Press,
Stanford, 2007, pp. 4, 6, 7.
47 For the retreat of Islamist demands on daily life, the rising conservatism and the narrowing
vision within the Islamic movement see Cihan Aktas¸, ‘I˙slami Hayat Tarzının Yeniden Kes¸fi’, in Tanıl
Bora and Murat Gu¨ltekin (eds), Modern Tu¨rkiye’de Siyasi Du¨s¸u¨nce, Vol. 9, I˙letis¸im, I˙stanbul, 2009,
pp. 651–668.
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the contemporary Muslim world, Islamist (or ex-Islamist) politicians cannot use
Islamic political concepts such as shura, biat, sharia and ummah in order to justify
their democratic vision and experience. Islamists in Turkey are not legitimizing
their transformation in terms of an Islamic vocabulary. Islamists have not been
able to establish an Islamic discourse of transformation which would encompass
different political positions on identity issues, ranging from those of leftists to
those of the Kurdish nationalists.
An interesting observation in this respect is voiced by an Islamist woman
writer, Fatma K. Barbarosog˘lu. She emphasizes the maladies of the so-called
‘transformation’ in the Islamist discourses:
That pious people are forced to translate their religious stipulations and
terminology of rights and freedoms into secular codes accelerated the
secularization of Islamic segments. The most obvious instance of this came
up with the headscarf ban. I am talking about the fact that the headscarf is
defended without hesitation as an issue of ‘women’s rights’.48
In the 1990s, Islamist intellectuals were more influential in creating a sense of
Islamic authenticity and in presenting alternative Islamic formulas to both
Kemalist modernization and Western liberal democracy. There was, for example,
an Islamic model of pluralism called the ‘multi-judiciary order’ which was
proposed on the basis of the Prophet Mohammad’s Medina Document49 and the
Ottoman millet system.50 However, in the 2000s, liberal writers and their
discourses have become dominant in justifying the reform processes and policies
of the JDP. In other words, it is not an Islamist discourse but a liberal discourse
which seeks to legitimize the JDP government’s policies with reference to the
following concepts: Europeanization, civilianization and the consolidation of
democracy. Although JDP leadership has declared its political identity as that of
a conservative democracy, it has benefited much from liberal discourses on
democracy, secularism and Kemalism, as expressed by leading Turkish liberal
writers.
Islamists have often declared their demand to have a genuine liberal
democratic regime in which religious freedoms would be fulfilled. They have left
48 Fatma K. Barbarosog˘lu, ‘Ya S¸is¸man Deg˘ilsek’, Yeni S¸afak, 23 June 2009.
49 In order to get rid of the conditions of repression and wrong-doing in the existing world,
Islamists mainly propose two ideal reference points: the Mecca model and the Medina model, that is,
society as it was shaped by the prophet Muhammad himself and the classical era of the Caliphate.
The Constitution of Medina established the terms for an alliance between Muhammad, his religious
community and the eight tribes of Medina in about AD 627. The contracting parties, both Muslims and
Jews, agreed to recognize Muhammad as their leader. Mozaffari, op. cit., p. 25. Ali Bulac¸ revived the
idea of the Medina Document in the 1990s in a series of articles in Kitap Dergisi, Birikim and Bilgi ve
Hikmet in order to present a new voluntary accord among different social blocs in Turkey, see
Menderes C¸ınar and Ays¸e Kadıog˘lu, ‘An Islamic critique of modernity in Turkey: politics of difference
backwards’, Orient, 40(1), 1999, pp. 53–69.
50 The WP adopted this model as a significant part of its alternative ideology, Just Order
(Adil Du¨zen). This model was based on the Islamist intellectuals’ critique of Kemalist nationalism, the
latter rejects representations of different identities in the public sphere. This multicultural model
advocated a new kind of Islamic pluralism that would revitalize the classical Islamic mechanism of
legal pluralities, relying on the idea of the self-rule of each legal community and rejecting the rule of
the majority, Yılmaz C¸olak, ‘Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: collective memory and cultural pluralism in
1990s Turkey’, Middle Eastern Studies, 42(4), July 2006, pp. 595–596.
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their claim of being Islamist and discovered that they are just religious Muslims,
since Islam is not an ideology. Islamist politicians as well as Islamist intellectuals
do not want to be referred to as ‘Islamist’. Ideas of social justice, the freedom of
religious education and the freedom to wear the headscarf in universities are no
longer justified by reference to Islamic principles. Islamist demands have been
reduced mainly to being in support of Muslim women’s quest for the wearing of
the headscarf at universities and for greater freedom for religious education.
More importantly, these Islamic demands are defended as democratic and liberal
rights rather than as religious duties. Since the heavy burden of Islamic identity
politics (the headscarf issue) seems to be placed on the shoulders of Islamist
women, they will continue to be the main actors in the transformation of Islamist
discourses. At the same time, however, it seems that their lifestyle will remain a
subject of securitization in Turkish politics.
An illustrating example can be found in the transformation of the JDP’s
political discourses. The label of conservative democracy is a vague concept and
for the time being it is not possible to say that there is a political adherence to this
new political identity even in the ranks of the party organization. Ex-Islamist
politicians of the JDP do not advance further interpretation of the concept of
justice in order to establish a new Islamic identity, though they do use this
concept in the name of the party. Justice, as the first word of the party’s name, has
two meanings: it signifies the party’s claim to fight injustice worsened by the
corruption within the Turkish system, as well as reminds us of the fact that as the
most significant Islamic concept since medieval times, justice has been a key issue
for Islamism. The JDP’s usage of the term ‘justice’ does not go beyond being a
symbolic value which signifies the cultural roots of the party. The JDP seems to be
trapped between an inclination to express an adherence to some references
(conservative values and justice) which are directly related to Islamist ontology
and an acceptance of dropping the Islamic vocabulary in order to protect the
Islamic sensitivities of society from the noxious effects of politicization and
conflict.51
Furthermore, Islamists have some difficulties in dealing with the challenge of
finding a way to be religious in a secular post-industrial society. The realities of
secular life force Islamists to move beyond the prescriptions of Islamic tradition
and text. The hybridizations and negotiations between Islamic imperatives and
the practices of secular life give rise to new Muslim subjectivities.52 Nevertheless,
it is still ambiguous what kind of collective Islamic identity, if any, will arise from
these subjectivities to signify a difference from the identity of those who are
secular. The troubles of this self-reflexive transformation have not as yet been
loudly spoken of in Islamist circles, since there are considerable benefits to being
in power. Islamists have been experiencing power, enrichment, upward class
mobilization and they have had successful careers during the period of the JDP
government. Opportunity spaces have enlarged for Islamists; they have occupied
the higher echelons of bureaucracy and they have become owners of large
51 Yasin Aktay argues that the transformation of Turkish Islamism in the case of the JDP represents
not ‘a failure of Islamism’ but ‘a further politicization’ (daha yu¨ksek bir siyasallas¸ma), ‘I˙slamcı Politik
Teolojinin Seyir Notları’, in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gu¨ltekin (eds), Modern Tu¨rkiye’de Siyasi Du¨s¸u¨nce,
Vol. 9, I˙letis¸im, I˙stanbul, 2009, pp. 1258–1280.
52 Nilu¨fer Go¨le, ‘Islamic visibilities and public sphere’, in Nilu¨fer Go¨le and Ludwig Ammann
(eds), Islam in Public, Istanbul Bilgi University Press, Istanbul, 2006, p. 28.
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companies and media groups. The charismatic leadership of Erdog˘an and its
popularity both in Turkey and in the broader Muslim world seems to discourage
any further Islamist critique of the JDP’s impact on Islamism.53 The tensions
between Kemalists and Islamists further conceal any internal discussions on the
coming ‘crisis of Islamic life’ for the Islamist movement.
There is also a dilemma that some of both the Islamic electorate and the
secularists share a belief that the JDP has not changed its political strategy to
Islamize Turkish society. This situation blurs the extent to which the JDP has
left its Islamic ideals. It also constitutes an effective barrier to any Islamist
critique of the JDP government’s policies over the religious demands of Islamist
circles. The JDP, since 2002, has not been criticized adequately by Islamists,
though it has not been able to fulfil Islamic demands on the headscarf and
religious education. Undoubtedly, the Kemalist securitization provides enough
material for excuses on the part of the JDP, which continues a politics of
‘patience’ (postponing Islamic demands until there is a broad consensus on
religious demands).54
The harsh criticism of the hard-liner Kemalists helps the party to postpone
the religious demands of its constituency. However, this masks an
impoverishment and the problems that are closely tied to the very heart of
the transformation of Islamism in Turkey. The conundrum facing Islamists in
the 2000s has been unnoticed largely due to this dilemma. For instance,
Islamists are not discussing how to combine an Islamic ethos and vocabulary
with secularism and with Turkey’s integration within the EU. Due to the
abovementioned impoverishment, one may argue that Turkey’s experience of
secularism, at least for the time being, cannot be a model for the rest of the
Muslim world. However, it does give some inspiration to the different sectors
of Muslims throughout the world. Perhaps Egypt’s Muslim Brethren, rather
than Turkey’s JDP, might constitute a more suitable model for forward-looking
Islamic movements.
Conclusion
Islamist movements have been transforming their discourses and programmes in
many parts of the Muslim world over the last two decades and the Turkish case is
no exception. The transformation of the Turkish Islamist movement has gained
particular momentum under the influence of the growing demands of the Islamic
middle class, the moderate positions of religious groups and other societal
groups including labour unions and business associations. Islamists are
rethinking their views on democracy and are focused, more than ever, on
tolerance, pluralism, participatory aspects of democracy, civil society and a
53 For the transformation in the JDP and Erdog˘an’s political outlook see Metin Heper and S¸ule
Toktas¸, ‘Islam, modernity and democracy in contemporary Turkey: the case of Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an’,
The Muslim World, 93(2), April 2003, pp. 157–185; Menderes C¸ınar, ‘Turkey’s transformation under the
AKP rule’, The Muslim World, 96(3), July 2006.
54 There were of course some instances where Islamist intellectuals criticized the JDP for losing its
willingness to transform the system and express its earlier Islamic sensitivities. The luxury lifestyle of
the rising Islamic bourgeoisie is also the main subject in these critiques. Sezai Karakoc¸, Ahmet
Tas¸getiren, Hamza Tu¨rkmen, Fehmi Koru and Ali Bulac¸ are five examples of critical Islamists to be
mentioned here.
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notion of living together. The JDP and the Gu¨len Movement, as the two leading
actors of Turkish Islamism, benefit greatly from the opportunities that have
opened up with the process of globalization and further integration with the EU.
Each individual case of Islamism should be interpreted within the
parameters of its own genuine evolution and difference. Surely, the most
striking characteristic of Turkish Islamism is related to the nature of the
relationship between Kemalism and Islam since the foundation of the Republic.
The underlying theme inherent in this relationship has often been a notion of
securitization. Kemalism securitized the issue of Islam and established a firm
control over religious life through the principle of secularism. In this sense,
securitization has to be seen as a key to understanding the relationship between
Islam and the state in Turkey.
The Kemalist experience of secularism and the specific characteristics of
Turkish Islam, interacting with each other, have produced a more moderate
course of Islamism and have prevented any radicalization of the Islamist
movement even in times of repression. Kemalist securitization is a dynamic and
complex process which has two different and interrelated aspects: the inclusion
of Islamist actors and the exclusion of Islamist discourses. In establishing
an official and acceptable form of Islam, by controlling the religious sphere,
Kemalism in fact illegalized any autonomous existence of religious groups and
excluded any Islamist discourse from the political arena. At the same time, it
integrated Islamist actors into the system. In addition, it is here suggested that
Kemalist securitization is a significant reason for the impoverishment of Islamist
discourses. Securitization also conceals aspects of that impoverishment due to
consumerism within Islamism. Indeed, the literature of transformation fails to
recognize the impoverishing aspects of the secularist constraints placed upon the
Islamist agenda.
Overall, Islamist politicians cannot use Islamic political concepts in order to
justify their democratic vision and experience. They can hardly legitimize their
transformation in terms of an Islamic vocabulary, which would encompass
different political positions on identity issues, ranging from those of leftists to
those of the Kurdish nationalists. In other words, Islamism in Turkey remains in
metamorphosis, driven, on the one hand, by the demands of a new middle class
and a new Islamic bourgeoisie for a pragmatic, open and moderate political
identity (including lessons taken from the 28 February Process) and, on the
other, by the loss of an Islamic ethos and vocabulary, which can be seen as
manifestations of an impoverishment both for Islamists and for Turkish politics.
What is certain is that the transformation of Islamism in Turkey will
contribute to the reconciliation of Islam and democracy and to the further
consolidation of Turkish democracy if Islamic actors are allowed to frame their
discourse in Islamic idioms. Then, Islamists will present a different synthesis of
Islamic and secular vocabularies in order to define their own transformation and
their projects on the future of the Turkish political system. To give an example,
the JDP’s adherence to an Anglo-American interpretation of secularism is not
legitimized within the Islamic movement by reference to some religious concepts
like ijtihad or the Constitution of Medina. However, this adherence still has to be
embraced by the Islamic electorate of this party in order to be seen as more than a
strategy to enlarge the political arena for religious freedoms. For otherwise, the
securitizing nature of the Kemalist policies towards Islam will continue to
The experience of Turkish Islamism 21
produce an impoverishment and further fears of a hidden agenda in Turkish
polity. Islamists have to find their own solutions to these questions by developing
their own vocabulary rather than looking for blueprints and the help of liberal
secular intellectuals. They are under the burden of creating new syntheses that
will combine Islamic vocabularies with the secular realities in a more global and
European Turkey.
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